Very interesting look at the social, economic, political and military structures that kept Germany fighting until the bitter end of World War II.

I believe I have nearly all Kershaw's at my disposal, but this may be his finest work to me.

If you're interested in the subject matter, why the Germans kept fighting long after the war was unwinnable, then give this one a try. If not, I can't recommend it because Kershaw isn't a very gifted writer. He's prone to run-on sentences and repeating his point.

Gotterdammerung 1945 . A litany of horrors unto the end. Ian Kershaw attempts to understand the reasons for the continued German resistance after the monumental defeats on the Eastern Front after which defeat was inevitable. There are none except the death drive.

Instead of suing for peace and loosening their grip, the nihilistic sadists of the Nazi High Command and their collaborators descended into an orgy of murder against their enemies and force their own population into a suicide pact. The worst part, from reading the footnotes, is the realization that the vast majority of the perpetrators survived the post-war tribunals and ended their lives in peace as accountants, bankers and so on.

Excellent. Very in depth account of the last 12 months within the Third Reich. You won't find it primarily about the military and conflict side of the war (although it is impossible avoid) but rather the fundamental workings and questions raised as to why Germany carried on despite everyone knowing deep down the outcome.

A bit repetitive at times but overall it was a very educational and informative read.

Like all of Kershaw's books, this one is well written and thoroughly researched. Here he reveals and cogently synthesizes the reasons why Nazi Germany was unable to choose a different paths in the last months of the war, causing untold suffering on countless people. This resolves, for me, one of the big puzzles of the war - why Germany, when it had clearly lost, did not act more rationally. There are many factors in play, according to Kershaw, but in essence the regime that Hitler and his coterie constructed and the police state that kept it upright, was incapable of course correction. Much like the Führer himself, no deviation was possible. Tragic beyond comprehension.

The utter refusal of the Nazis to surrender in the face of an unstoppable Soviet juggernaut is not hard to explain. They were staunch anti-bolsheviks and knew that the various war crimes they perpetrated would only earn them a hangman's noose. But why did normal people keep fighting? Why didn't the army collapse? Why did generals hold out until what seemed like the bitter end? And why did civilians blithely wait for the end to come, offering no resistance to the regime that threatened to destroy their country? This last point seems especially true, considering revolution and political upheaval had been so important in bringing about the end of WW1.

Kershaw lays out in his typical scintillating prose why the vast majority of Germans waited quietly waited for the end. They were terrified of the Nazi government, and with good reason. And any potential leaders who could lead a movement against the Nazis had either been ousted during the 30s, or had played a substantial role in the crimes perpetrated by the regime, and therefore their bridges were burned. The people who could end the war, therefore had no reason to do so, and the people who needed the war to end had little way to bring that about.

In this excellent book Ian Kershaw scrutinises the fall of Nazi Germany from the Assassination attempt on Hitler in July 44 through to the final unconditional surrender.

Fascinating analysis is given throughout each chapter. Brilliant footnotes through to works cited (bibliography) that should have anyone interested in the subject of the last year of Nazi Germany’s demise salivating. For those who may wonder why Nazi Germany fought to the very limits of their capabilities this book covers many possible discussion points. A few follow.

The failed July 20th assassination plot left any possible opposition to the regime utterly leaderless, leading to the further politicisation of the Wehrmacht upper echelons. Any hint of insubordination towards even military tactics was treated as treasonous. With that any thought of political involvement in a movement to discuss the end with the allies was made moot once there was a demand for unconditional surrender. With military power now in the hands of Nazis it was now committed to victory or downfall. Also considered is if the assassination had been successful there could have been another ‘stab in the back’ legend.This played on the minds of many.

The blame game following the fall of France to the Allies was an event that was a great shock to all Germany. An example covered is that in September 1944 Aachen was the first city in Germany proper to come under Allied attack with the panic of the citizens and inability of the Nazi Party to organise and assist causing a “shambles” to quote the author. 116th Panzer Division arrived and took control of the civilian population by stopping the ‘stupid evacuation’. This evacuation comment by the commander General Gerd Graf von Schwerin lead to his eventual dismissal even with the defence becoming fierce. Hitler ordering an utmost radical defence of the city. Relationships between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht Officer class broke down with the Officer Class accused of being ‘saboteurs of war’ by even their own soldiers. To quote the author “…..sunk resignation, not burning rebellion….” became the course of the bitter defence.

Operation Bagration may have prolonged the war. Instead of a four front attack “a huge concentrated surge” through south Poland to cut off Centre and North army groups may possibly have allowed the Wehrmacht to be “patched up and fight on.” Inhabitants of East Prussia, with memories of Russian incursions in The Great War, were also more susceptible to Nazi anti Bolshevik propaganda than their western German counterparts. Those that had listened to the troops returning from the east knew that the war had been bitter and that atrocities towards Jews and the civilian populations had now become a serious issue for the average German with the Red Army on the doorstep.

The Battle of the Bulge and the decline of German economic output as the Allies attacks on transport networks etc takes its toll. A Werner Bosch, who worked for Speer, while under interrogation by the allies after the war had ended, was quoted as saying that people in his position “….could do nothing except get on with their own work” even considering that he thought the war lost in the Spring of 1944. He was one of many effective in keeping the war going for as long as it did no matter how desperate the situation. The regime also let the allied Morgenthau plan be known to the public at large. With this the plan to split Germany into a “powerless, dismembered country with a pre-industrial economy” played very much into the thoughts that there was ‘no opportunity’ for individuals ‘to take action against the war’.

So called defeatist attitudes were heavily punished. All ranks fought on due to fear of reprisals to their family plus general apathy in some circumstances. Even when most thought the war nearly over an automatic sense of obedience was held as other than family what else was there to do! Fatalism was a major issue with many. For those that deserted there was death. Many received death sentences from flying courts and those left fighting had little more to do than conform or face the harshest of penalties. Added was a propaganda campaign that at this point became shriller than all previous with specific reference to the “Asiatic hordes” as Nazi racial policy since 1933 had been ingrained into the masses. This caused mass panic among the civilian population with the soldiers being bombarded with exhortation to fight against those that would slaughter their women and children. Fear of foreigners was rife and even at the end the public invariably had no issue with the treatment of the prisoners on death marches as they were considered criminals.

At the top level many excuses were used from the duty not to the break loyalty pledge to Hitler, fear of Bolshevism through to the likes of Keitel, Jodl and Kesselring claiming they fought on in hope of the fracturing of the Allies into east and west camps. The state had built a cult around Hitler that was so solid in structure that there was little that could be changed. The elites had been divided and never had the “..collective will nor the mechanisms of power to prevent Hitler taking Germany to total destruction.”

Easily one of the the best books I have read. Highly recommended.