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jembw's review against another edition
5.0
This is a book I have dipped into over the years but never read from cover to cover. Technically, I still haven't because I listened to it on Audible during my commute! However, it is now one of a very small subset of books I own that I have on audio, kindle, and in hard copy. Ostrom has been a massive influence on my thinking about how the world works (or should work!), and my admiration of her work has increased further now I have taken in this masterpiece from start to finish.
klagge's review against another edition
5.0
This work is, for me, a model of great social science work. As someone thinking of going to an economics PhD program in the not-so-distant future, I will definitely benefit from having this book in the back of my mind.
The topic of the book is common-pool resources (CPRs)--which economists define as resources that are "rival" (if I take some of it, that reduces the supply available to anyone else) but "non-excludable" (it is difficult to prevent people from making use of it). A classic example of this, and one among those studied by Ostrom, is a fishery--there are only so many fish, but with a big enough area, it's pretty difficult to police boundaries or restrictions.
The mainstream economics literature, and because of it much popular commentary, has focused on such resources from a set of related perspectives referred to as "the prisoner's dilemma" and "the tragedy of the commons." These models suggest that in some CPR situations, individuals acting in their rational self-interest will end up making decisions that are sub-optimal from a group point of view--generally, overusing the resource. As we can observe with most deep-sea fisheries, this is often indeed the case. But Ostrom's interest lies in those cases where the predictions of these classic models do not come true: situations where a group of people has established a durable voluntary system for regulating use of the CPR, which neither resorts to privatization nor external regulation (the two preferred remedies of the tragedy-of-the-commons crowd).
Ostrom's style is extraordinarily appealing to me. Though the book is relatively recent, she writes in what I would call a "classic" style reminiscent of Smith or Keynes. She works systematically and logically, frequently making use of fundamental concepts of economics (for instance, discount rates), but the book is free of equations or mathematical models. I am sure that Ostrom was conversant in mathematical modeling, and used it in her academic papers, but it is a testament to the significance of her ideas that she was able to express them in this way yet have the book retain a strongly academic (that is, not "popular") character.
I also really appreciated the perspectives Ostrom took on models and math--something Smith and Keynes didn't have the opportunity to do because of the state of the discipline in their time. She talks persuasively about the model as metaphor. For example, she discusses the way that the prisoner's dilemma has become such a dominant way of thinking about collective challenges, despite the fact that it is highly specialized and requires that the payoffs be just so, because of the captivating counterintuitiveness of the result. She talks quite compellingly about the way economists tend to take the perspective of "the state", and how often economic models assume that individuals will be self-centered and myopic while the technocrats in the government will be wise and far-sighted.
In addition to these matters of taste, this book is filled with interesting concepts, and particularly, applications of concepts from other disciplines to economics. I will just mention: quasi-voluntary compliance, second-order collective action problems, the effects of discount-rate heterogeneity, incomplete utility functions.
The topic of the book is common-pool resources (CPRs)--which economists define as resources that are "rival" (if I take some of it, that reduces the supply available to anyone else) but "non-excludable" (it is difficult to prevent people from making use of it). A classic example of this, and one among those studied by Ostrom, is a fishery--there are only so many fish, but with a big enough area, it's pretty difficult to police boundaries or restrictions.
The mainstream economics literature, and because of it much popular commentary, has focused on such resources from a set of related perspectives referred to as "the prisoner's dilemma" and "the tragedy of the commons." These models suggest that in some CPR situations, individuals acting in their rational self-interest will end up making decisions that are sub-optimal from a group point of view--generally, overusing the resource. As we can observe with most deep-sea fisheries, this is often indeed the case. But Ostrom's interest lies in those cases where the predictions of these classic models do not come true: situations where a group of people has established a durable voluntary system for regulating use of the CPR, which neither resorts to privatization nor external regulation (the two preferred remedies of the tragedy-of-the-commons crowd).
Ostrom's style is extraordinarily appealing to me. Though the book is relatively recent, she writes in what I would call a "classic" style reminiscent of Smith or Keynes. She works systematically and logically, frequently making use of fundamental concepts of economics (for instance, discount rates), but the book is free of equations or mathematical models. I am sure that Ostrom was conversant in mathematical modeling, and used it in her academic papers, but it is a testament to the significance of her ideas that she was able to express them in this way yet have the book retain a strongly academic (that is, not "popular") character.
I also really appreciated the perspectives Ostrom took on models and math--something Smith and Keynes didn't have the opportunity to do because of the state of the discipline in their time. She talks persuasively about the model as metaphor. For example, she discusses the way that the prisoner's dilemma has become such a dominant way of thinking about collective challenges, despite the fact that it is highly specialized and requires that the payoffs be just so, because of the captivating counterintuitiveness of the result. She talks quite compellingly about the way economists tend to take the perspective of "the state", and how often economic models assume that individuals will be self-centered and myopic while the technocrats in the government will be wise and far-sighted.
In addition to these matters of taste, this book is filled with interesting concepts, and particularly, applications of concepts from other disciplines to economics. I will just mention: quasi-voluntary compliance, second-order collective action problems, the effects of discount-rate heterogeneity, incomplete utility functions.
wietse111's review against another edition
5.0
Puur als boek wellicht niet fantastisch, het is vrij academisch, maar voor een academisch werk behoorlijk leesbaar. Toch 5 sterren voor het onderwerp en omdat mijn liefde voor milieu economie toch wel iig deels hiervandaan komt. Voor het eerst gelezen tijdens m'n studie, nu weer herlezen voor een boekenclub, en het blijven toch vrij fundamentele en super interessante inzichten in hoe mensen samen kunnen werken. Een toffe combinatie van theorie en empirie over hoe instituties kunnen ontstaan die common pool resource situations goed kunnen managen, maar ook wat dat kan bedreigen.
hardwarejunkie9's review against another edition
5.0
A prime champion of the "Books Everyone Absolutely Should be Familiar With" category. Addresses many issues on destruction of common resources in a rational, empirical, and human manner.
Ostrom richly deserved the Nobel she won based on this.
Ostrom richly deserved the Nobel she won based on this.
nolasis17's review against another edition
5.0
This should be a required reading for anyone in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, especially if interested in environmental policy. Ostrom’s writing and presentation of her framework for an alternative form of governance is methodical, clear, and cogent.
nat_sanchez's review against another edition
challenging
informative
slow-paced
5.0
It took me a year to finish this book, as I could only digest about 5 to 10 pages at a time and I needed breaks to think about each section before moving on. But, it was well worth the effort, and I would recommend it to anyone interested in a nitty gritty analysis of why “the tragedy of the commons” is not inevitable and what conditions make local collective action harder or easier.
rhyslindmark's review against another edition
3.0
Relatively concise analysis of how common-pool resources (CPRs) are governed in a bottom-up way (without government or private intervention).
My main issue with the book is that it's scoped to physical CPRs like fisheries. I would've loved to see how this applies outside that setting.
My main issue with the book is that it's scoped to physical CPRs like fisheries. I would've loved to see how this applies outside that setting.
paulataua's review against another edition
5.0
What a stimulating read! it’s so good find a book that tries to get to grips with how to find practical solutions to situations that share aspects of the tragedy of the commons. It's fascinating to read clear discussion of practical examples of ways to engender commitment and monitor without resorting to leviathan style control or market forces. Great read!
rhythimashinde's review against another edition
4.0
A great book for understanding and design of institutions and community management approach. This was the best book I could come across in bottom-up policy making