The thing about the Israel-Palestine debate in contemporary American Judaism is that there is no such thing. The matter is settled. American Jews are supposed to shut up, get in line, and support Israel no matter what. And despite large divergences in culture and politics, aside from some quiet grumbling, that's how it's worked. And if anything, American Jews are actually less supportive of Israel than the average American, and certainly less supportive than the average politician or media figure, who'd rather slit their own throat than cross the Israel lobby. In We Are Not One, Alterman masterfully traces the origins and consequences of this unswerving support.

The book opens with a 2019 quote from then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, "If the capitol crumbles to the ground, the one thing that'll remain is our commitment to Israel", a statement less metaphorical after Trump's January 6th coup attempt. Republicans are even more ardently pro-Israel than Democrats in a rare bipartisan consensus.

At Israel's founding, American support for the new state was far from given. While FDR was cosmopolitan and had many Jewish friends and staffers, Harry Truman had the typical provincial antisemitism of the time, yet came around as a strong supporter. The Jewish community was internally divided on the Zionist question, with the leading American Jewish Committee unable to reach a position and various rabbis dueling for priority. The romance of the Israeli War of Independence, and a cannily organized PR campaign around the novel and movie Exodus by Leon Uris helped link American sentiments to Israel.

While the sentimental attachment to Israel was amplified by victories in the Six Day War, and disaster into victory of the Yom Kippur War, American Jewish support for Israel was financial and political, but rarely personal. The number of American Jews who made aliyah was always vanishingly small. Israel was an idea, a Zionist imaginary of "next year in Jerusalem", rather than an actual move to Tel Aviv.

But the action practice of Zionism, an ethnic nationalist movement which requires perforce the salami-slicing occupation of land inhabited by Palestinians, was anathema to mainstream American Jewish liberal sensibilities. For much of the 20th century, this cognitive dissonance was carefully managed. Jewish liberalism ended at Israeli borders. Three interlocking political factors ensured this cognitive dissonance didn't boil over.

The first was a minority neoconservative movement, a hard anti-communist rejection of both traditional American conservative isolationism and Nixon's détente. In this new political movement, with many ideological Jewish Americans, Israel was a bastion of American values against the Soviet-backed Arab states, against the conventional wisdom that oil and population meant the United States should buddy up to Arabs who could support American economic interests. The second was the rise of political Evangelical Christianity. The return of Jews to the Holy Land is a key part of Evangelical eschatology, a necessary prelude before Revelations. And third was the capture of American institutional Judaism by billionaire donors with hard Zionist views, primarily the late Sheldon Adelson (and may his memory be a bight). AIPAC became not merely a Jewish or even pro-Israel lobbying group, but specifically a pro-Likud organization with the barest pretense of larger Jewish values, much more comfortable with billionaires and evangelicals than actual Jews.

This state of affairs has had several effects, both in America and Israel. The first is the enervated state of contemporary Reform Judaism. Pragmatically, culturally there's not much to distinguish Reform Judaism from a mainstream Protestant denomination, when Judaism has often been defined by deliberate difference from surrounding gentiles, and mainstream Protestantism has had a rough 20th century as well. But as Jewish leaders urgently see younger Jews (myself included) drifting away from the faith and marrying outside the religion, which is reasonably caused by the fact that aside from Zionism and Holocaust remembrance, there's barely any there there in Reform Judaism, their reaction has been to triple down on the Zionist card.

The second is the AIPAC noise machine, which is centered on AIPAC but supported by a wide range of longstanding Jewish organizations and hastily spun-off PR fronts. Jews certainly don't control the media, or the banks, or government, but crossing AIPAC is a bad idea. If you're a politician, you'll be primaried with your opponent raking in hefty support. If you're a professor, a journalist, or other public intellectual, even the mildest criticism of Israeli policies, such as referring to the state of affairs as an occupation, apartheid, saying "Palestinian homeland", or remarking that maybe Israel should consider American wishes given the hundreds of billions of dollars of aid they have received, will invite a swarm of criticism from ardent Zionist culture warriors. And third, while at the same time arguing that accusations of "dual-loyalty" are an anti-Semitic attack, AIPAC will label any Jew who speaks against them as self-hating, and demand an unflinching primary loyalty to Israel.

The last consequence is an active disdain for American Jews on the part of the Israelis, and for American political priorities. Israelis don't much like American Jews. They don't regard Reform Judaism as a valid religion. And while they'll happily agree to anything at various peace conferences, not a single Israeli prime minister has ever done more than briefly halted settlements in the occupied territories or given the most perfunctory rebuke to extrajudicial Israeli security service actions. The Israeli future has no peace plan, simply a large question mark and then "and no more Arabs", and we should be honest about that.

Alterman's book is comprehensive, deeply sourced, and utterly damning in its conclusions. It's provoked a serious rethinking of my own relationship to institutional Judaism. Something is going to break, but I can't yet tell you what it is.