Scan barcode
A review by crooked_
ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss
2.0
The beginning of this book was a positive one, and the author gives a genuinely good look at the foundations of what would become IS, as well as some of its main early figures. However, it then goes into a wider look at the conditions that allowed for ISIS to rise to power from ISI/AQI, and here is where I first noticed the weak spots of the book. While the book is clearly well-researched because a lot of work has been put into doing interviews and finding sources, the bias of the author stands out incredibly clearly to the point where it is harming the historiography of the work.
The author is uncritically reliant on US officials and US defence sources, and this results in an overly dramatic anti-Iran and anti-Syria stance. Throughout the book, the US is portrayed as good intention, albeit often bumbling and foolish, whereas Iran and Assad are portrayed as all-powerful, Machiavellian villains. This viewpoint is derived from a mixture of uncritical use of US sources who have a vested political interest in promoting this perspective and from unscientific extrapolation of Syrian and Jihadist source.
While, yes, there is evidence Iran + Assad were involved to a degree in the rise of IS, the author wrongly extrapolates a few isolated instances into effectively saying they were MOSTLY TO BLAME for the rise of the Islamic State. This is categorically untrue. It also portrays the Iran-Al Qaeda relationship as much deeper than most historiography regards it because of this uncritical reliance on pro-US sources, although the depth + nature of this relationship is highly disputed and shady at best. It even relies on the EXTREMELY CONTROVERSIAL court cases of 9/11 victims vs Iran + Syria and portrays it as 'absolute evidence' that the relationship is significant. This is, again, wrong.
Further mistakes that come from this over-reliance are in how Weiss depicts Iraqi Shia as united and entirely beholden to Iran post-2003. As other works such as Phebe Marr's Modern History of Iraq shows, Iraqi Shia groups were extremely divided + fragmented post-2003, and have never been united. Iran has had a powerful influence on Shia groups post-2003, that is true, but it has never been wholly hegemonic over them. He even claims this to the degree where it is implied that Iran backing Maliki = Iran controls Maliki, which is categorically untrue. Maliki has always been backed by one person above all: himself. He was always independent-minded and has an independent support base beyond Iran, as is evidenced by the fact he has remained a powerful figure after Iran stopped supporting him at the same time the US did around 2014.
Finally, I was disappointed that, despite the title of the book, very little time is actually spent looking into how IS operates *in the present* (or, at least, in 2015). The book is, in reality, a history of IS from Zarqawi to its emergence, and only one chapter (the final one) takes a serious look at the functioning of IS as a state. Unfortunately, the fact it's only one chapter means it isn't particularly in depth. If it was a 50-50 split, I would've been happy, but in the end, this book is just one of MANY that go over the history of IS with a focus on post-2003 Iraq, leaving a big hole in the academic literature as to the actual functioning of "al-Dawla" itself, rather than just where it came from.
I feel bad for leaving this as only 2 stars because it genuinely is well-researched, and Weiss clearly hasn't half-assed it. The author talks to an enormous variety of sources ranging from Syrians to Jihadists to Americans, and you can get some genuinely good insight into the IS members he gets information from. However, the poor social scientific practice of how the research was analysed and implemented in the book (uncritical acceptance of American line, extrapolation of individual opinions as generalisable fact) means I simply cannot recommend it. While I learnt some things from it as I know enough about the topic through my years of research to cut through the BS, a less familiar reader (read: nerd, I am not bigging myself up here) could be gravely misinformed if they took it at face value.
The author is uncritically reliant on US officials and US defence sources, and this results in an overly dramatic anti-Iran and anti-Syria stance. Throughout the book, the US is portrayed as good intention, albeit often bumbling and foolish, whereas Iran and Assad are portrayed as all-powerful, Machiavellian villains. This viewpoint is derived from a mixture of uncritical use of US sources who have a vested political interest in promoting this perspective and from unscientific extrapolation of Syrian and Jihadist source.
While, yes, there is evidence Iran + Assad were involved to a degree in the rise of IS, the author wrongly extrapolates a few isolated instances into effectively saying they were MOSTLY TO BLAME for the rise of the Islamic State. This is categorically untrue. It also portrays the Iran-Al Qaeda relationship as much deeper than most historiography regards it because of this uncritical reliance on pro-US sources, although the depth + nature of this relationship is highly disputed and shady at best. It even relies on the EXTREMELY CONTROVERSIAL court cases of 9/11 victims vs Iran + Syria and portrays it as 'absolute evidence' that the relationship is significant. This is, again, wrong.
Further mistakes that come from this over-reliance are in how Weiss depicts Iraqi Shia as united and entirely beholden to Iran post-2003. As other works such as Phebe Marr's Modern History of Iraq shows, Iraqi Shia groups were extremely divided + fragmented post-2003, and have never been united. Iran has had a powerful influence on Shia groups post-2003, that is true, but it has never been wholly hegemonic over them. He even claims this to the degree where it is implied that Iran backing Maliki = Iran controls Maliki, which is categorically untrue. Maliki has always been backed by one person above all: himself. He was always independent-minded and has an independent support base beyond Iran, as is evidenced by the fact he has remained a powerful figure after Iran stopped supporting him at the same time the US did around 2014.
Finally, I was disappointed that, despite the title of the book, very little time is actually spent looking into how IS operates *in the present* (or, at least, in 2015). The book is, in reality, a history of IS from Zarqawi to its emergence, and only one chapter (the final one) takes a serious look at the functioning of IS as a state. Unfortunately, the fact it's only one chapter means it isn't particularly in depth. If it was a 50-50 split, I would've been happy, but in the end, this book is just one of MANY that go over the history of IS with a focus on post-2003 Iraq, leaving a big hole in the academic literature as to the actual functioning of "al-Dawla" itself, rather than just where it came from.
I feel bad for leaving this as only 2 stars because it genuinely is well-researched, and Weiss clearly hasn't half-assed it. The author talks to an enormous variety of sources ranging from Syrians to Jihadists to Americans, and you can get some genuinely good insight into the IS members he gets information from. However, the poor social scientific practice of how the research was analysed and implemented in the book (uncritical acceptance of American line, extrapolation of individual opinions as generalisable fact) means I simply cannot recommend it. While I learnt some things from it as I know enough about the topic through my years of research to cut through the BS, a less familiar reader (read: nerd, I am not bigging myself up here) could be gravely misinformed if they took it at face value.