Academic theory is frequently a mess; the author needs to balance between correctly explaining the details of their case studies with sufficient power to be useful on other problems. And in the social sciences, where you can't really test theories, it's doubly hard.

With that in mind, Ostrom manages to synthesize a powerful and rigorous theory about how rules structure the use of common pool resources. Drawing from examples in political economy and game theory, she develops a model of how rules work (ADICO, on pg 139), and the kinds of institutions that lead to better outcomes than Hobbsian rational self-interest.

Her framework is rigorous enough to allow comparisons across diverse case studies, simple enough that most people can use it without being polymathic geniuses (*cough* Sheila Jasanoff *cough*), and flexible enough to accurately depicted the complexity of the real world.

Ostrom received the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics for her work on common pool resources. I think any scholar working in this area who did not use Ostrom's framework would have some serious justification to do, so why only four stars? Well, first I'm not sure how well her framework can be extended beyond common pool resources; seeing everything as this kind of social dilemma is limited. Second, while this is a well-researched book, it's also a slog. I can't imagine sitting down and enjoying this book, which is not true of some academics.