johnolphnt's review

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challenging informative medium-paced

4.0

blurbetal's review

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informative inspiring reflective slow-paced

4.75

phdee's review

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challenging hopeful informative reflective slow-paced

3.0

adamsw216's review

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informative medium-paced

4.0

In Not Born Yesterday author and researcher studying social cognition Hugo Mercier makes the argument that, in spite of popular belief, people are not actually gullible or credulous. 

The author begins by arguing against the theory that credulousness is associated with a lack of sophistication or "intelligence" (e.g. the less educated are more gullible). The "arms race" theory explains gullibility as predator and prey evolving mechanisms to outwit one another, resulting in one eventually having a temporary advantage over another. However, he claims this is a false way of looking at the issue, and that it is more likely that humans have evolved not from being more gullible to being less gullible over time, but that, in order to survive, the opposite is true.
So far, it seems like he's making a semantic argument over the definitions of "sophisticated," "intelligence," and "reliable sources."

Humans are social creatures, and a common natural imperative is to seek approval from others. As such, Mercier argues that people do not hold erroneous or extreme beliefs because they are "intuitive beliefs," but because they are using them to seek approval. For example, innocent people will confess to crimes they did not commit because, depending on the scenario, they may believe that confessing to the crime and seeking forgiveness is better than continuing to be badgered by the police. Or people who publicly proclaim their extremist views might be doing so because they are purposefully seeking the disapproval of those outside of their circle of believers in order to signal how dedicated they are to their group. This, of course, escalates over time until people are making increasingly irrational statements. Mercier argues that none of this has to do with credulity or gullibility, but are merely manifestations of our innate desire to belong to social groups, whether they are mainstream or fringe.

Since communication is the key to our social success, we place a lot of weight in the "social points" we gain from successful communication attempts. If we can give someone a piece of information and that piece of information is accepted, then that person's opinion of us has increased slightly. If that piece of information then turns out to be false, then that person's opinion of us will be damaged. Therefore, the author argues, rumor and false information spreads so easily because they are low-cost social points. If they turn out to be true, then we seek to gain social standing, but if they are false we do not lose as much as if we had been confidently stating a fact. 

This also ties into why "fake news" spreads so easily. "Fake news" often takes the form of a threat. Something terrible is happening to someone somewhere. Immigrants are committing crimes, politicians are involved in human trafficking rings, or any other threatening problem. We are cognitively inclined to be more receptive to threatening information because the consequences for not accepting the information could be worse than accepting it. If someone tells you the house is going to collapse with you in it even though it seems perfectly fine, the potential outcome ignoring the warning is far more disastrous than if you followed the person out of the building.

People find it easier to espouse views that have virtually no apparent consequences on their lives. If someone tells you that there is another planet beyond Pluto, it really doesn't matter if you believe them or not. The same thing goes for many matters of public policy in the government. The administration may tell you that there a particular foreign regime is bad, but whether you have a favorable or negative view of that foreign regime really doesn't change your life in any meaningful way. Therefore, the consequences for proclaiming that view can be measured by their more immediate "social point" implications rather than being an intuitively held belief.

I have to admit, while I went into this book with a healthy dose of skepticism. However, by the end of the book, I can't help but feel that Mercier made some compelling arguments. It doesn't really change the end result—people will vote against their best interests, false rumors will spread, and conspiracy theories abound. But the conclusion can be distilled down into the idea that humans are simply not that easy to persuade. In fact, that's our weakness; we are too stubborn in our beliefs to listen to or trust those who might know better. Mercier offers no easy answers to these issues, but perhaps looking at it from a different perspective will help convince some people that it's worthwhile to think more critically and earnestly listen to what others have to say.

lakmus's review

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4.0

A collection of examples of how humans aren't actually stupidly gullible, or gullible with caveats, with some theoretical background up front (epistemic aka open vigilance, see Merceir & Sperber, 2011, 2017 and Sperber 2000 (?, i think) for a more formal treatment), and a summary chapter recapping everything last – check that one if you want a quick dive.

Haven't read Steven Pinker's "Better Angels" yet, but I am guessing these two go together in a "humans aren't a lost cause" kind of genre, which I find preferable over doom & gloom lamentation on human imperfections. It's also more helpful, because it focuses on the nuances of when and how people decide what information is true and what to do with it, and makes people with beliefs different from your own (at least as they declare them) seem less insane and more tolerable.

My main gripe with this book is that the theory could benefit from being more specific. Open vigilance by itself is not a proper theory per se, more like a concept that the author applies and uses to interpret inconsistencies in the data on how humans do/not believe certain things. This kind of retrospective application weakens the punch, opening room for just-so-story critiques commonly weighted against evolutionary psychology. From memory of reading some of his & Sperber's previous work, there is some more meat to it, which could have been included. I am guessing from the general vibe of the book that it was trying to tilt more towards 'popular science', which could explain this (although somewhat unexpected, since its a university press).

mahir007's review

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5.0

I have just started to read it , but I already think that it deserves the 5 stars

branch_c's review

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4.0

This book makes a well-presented case that people are not as gullible as they're often claimed to be; rather, what appears to be gullibility is a tendency to follow "evolutionarily valid cue[s]" (p. 73) - including, importantly, the behavior and persuasive efforts of others in our environment.

While there's a lot of concern about fake news and propaganda, the evidence presented here suggests that people are not typically fooled or convinced to act against their interests. Rather, they choose to believe, support, and join groups that already offer something advantageous to them. When the leaders of those groups promulgate information in an effort to persuade people to behave in certain ways, it's not necessarily the information that causes the behavior change. Instead, the information provides a justification for people to behave in ways that they were already inclined toward anyway. Regarding the sentiment attributed to Voltaire that "Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities", Mercier points out that "this is in fact rarely true. As a rule, it is wanting to commit atrocities that makes you believe absurdities." (p. 202)

I learned at least a few things from this book, including the fact that in some languages, the grammar rules require that you "specify how you acquired a given piece of information." (p. 168) Mercier also puts forth a theory explaining the proliferation of blatantly obvious email scams. He points out that "while sending millions of messages was practically free, responding to them cost the scammers time and energy." Therefore, they may have made the messages "voluntarily preposterous. In this way, the scammers ensured that any effort spent engaging with individuals would only be spent on the most promising marks." (p. 251) Hard to say whether this theory is true, but I haven't heard any better explanation for what we observe.

Mercier allows that it still makes sense to combat authoritarianism, misinformation, and other sources of false beliefs, but suggests that we shouldn't expect this to prevent people from making "wrong" decisions that they see as being advantageous to them. The points made here are both heartening (misinformation isn't as damaging as we might have thought) and depressing (people will behave badly anyway as long as it's in their interest to do so).

The one thing I take issue with is the idea that we need to recognize and be sympathetic to people's unstated desires and goals, rather than whether they actually believe what they profess to. While there may be social value in this, it seems to me that we need to take what people claim to believe at face value - it's both patronizing and unfair to do otherwise, and claim that we know what they "really" believe. It seems obvious to me that it should be socially unacceptable to profess something known to be false in order to gain some personal advantage.

In any case, that's a tangential issue; Mercier's main points about trust and belief are solid and intriguing, and this book is a clearly written exposition of those points.

lanzino's review

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3.0

I listened to this book. I found it a bit hard to follow at times, but probably because of not being a native english speaker and the narrator being a bit too fast. However, short after finishing the book, the message about the cost of not trusting vs actually trusting has started germinating some thoughts, so I can actually say that it is having an influence on my behaviours.

bootman's review

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5.0

3rd read:
This was my third time reading this book, and it’s still one of the best I’ve read about why we listen to certain people and trust them. Hugo debunks a lot of myths about gullibility, and the book helps you understand why people listen to certain figures when the rest of us can clearly see the person is lying or sharing bad information. This book is an excellent source if you’re looking to learn more about human reasoning and behavior. I still have a bunch of questions as I continue to be interested in this topic, but this book always answers most of them.

2nd read:
This is one of my favorite books, and I had to read it again. Each day, we’re flooded with information and have a ton of conversations, but why do we trust who we trust? And are we naturally gullible or skeptical? During times of science denial, misinformation, and people having a tremendous amount of reach on social media, we should all understand how trust works. Mercier breaks this down in such a unique way blending evolutionary psychology with actual data, and he argues that we’re naturally skeptical. I think one reason I love this book is because it’s the only one that doesn’t seem to fully embrace the truth default theory, and Mercier has extremely strong arguments about how we get to a place of trusting people. Throughout the book, he also debunks myths about misinformation on social media and other pieces of conventional wisdom that doesn’t have strong scientific backing. This was my second time reading this book, and I’ll most likely be reading it again.

theciz's review

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challenging informative medium-paced

4.25

An interesting book about gullibility and trust - how these mechanisms work in human societies and challenging some common myths about crowd behaviour, credibility, the influence of social media, etc. I can’t quite take as optimistic a view as Mercier does, but there’s a lot of well reasoned arguments, and a lot to think about. This is pop psychology, but doesn’t suffer for it. Will be interesting to pick Canetti back up after this.