Ian Kershaw's book aims to answer just one question: why did the Germans continue to fight even after the second world war was clearly lost? He reviews a number of explanations given, ranging from the reasonable to the ludicrous, and settles on an interpretation of how the Nazi state had been established and how it was still running in 1944-5 that prevented popular rebellion or a military coup, even when almost no one believed the war could still be won. Hitler's dreaded a 1918-style end to the war, with soldiers' mutinies and workers' strikes. He and his regime managed to make these impossible. A beautifully-written, well-researched investigation into a historical nightmare.

As a disclaimer I was coming into reading this book with a basic knowledge of World War 2, but with this being the first book that really went into detail about the end of the war. In school, even at GCSE level, you learn about things such as D-Day, but then the gap between that and the end of the war is kind of left unmentioned. This book brilliantly fills that gap, and for me was fascinating to understand just how it was possible for Germany to continue fighting despite inevitable total destruction.
If you're not interested in history books then this certainly won't be for, it's not exactly a 'light read'. And I've seen in other reviews that there may be other books which cover this subject better. But personally, if you're someone who has no major existing knowledge on the subject and wants to learn more, then the engaging delivery of the content in this book to me warrants a recommendation. It really will help you understand the power structure that allowed the war to continue for so long, and forces you to ask a number of challenging questions when relating the events of 1944-45 to the political climate of today.

From the cover:

"What made Germany keep fighting to the death, even when it was clear it would lose the Second World War?"

In his magnificent, awe-inspiring book 'The End', Ian Kershaw sets out to examine and try and explain, or at least come up with some possible reasons for, the above. He examines every aspect of German life in what would turn out to be the last two years of the war (and I do feel it is important to remember while reading this, that until very late on, they of course didn't know that it would end in May 1945. They knew they couldn't win (as things stood) but they didn't know when they would be deemed to have lost. So one cannot think 'why are they doing/thinking that, when there are only two months to go?', for instance). He combs the bureaucracy, the aristocracy, the Army, the Navy (what is left of) the Airforce, the ordinary people, the Nazi Party, the personality cult of Hitler, the power struggles and in-fighting of his heirs apparent and much, much more. Quite apart from anything else, this is an incredible summation of research, one surely without equal even in whole histories of the Second World War.

Exhaustive surely isn't the word for it. Definitive, most likely. I can't see how anyone could in the future possibly consider going over this ground again and finding anything more to say. This has dotted the i's, crosses the t's. Full stop.

Whilst Kershaw does draw some conclusions to try and answer the question why, what I do really like is the feeling that I was actually on the journey, the search for the reasons, alongside him. He states his purpose and lays down his methods at the start of the book really well, then the investigation of the facts begins. All through, I felt that I was beginning to understand the strands of reasoning, as Kershaw also came across them. I agree with him (I can't disagree with him, not being in the remotest sense German) and his conclusions, but I also came forward with a couple of my own. Ones that were the product of his research and his fantastic book, but which weren't actually exactly stated by him. But I get the idea that that would be fine with him. But then another thing I feel sure he is saying, is that there is no simple, single, glib answer to the question. It's all of them in many different ways on many different levels.

One point I would make here is, it would help if this wasn't the first, or only book on the Second World War you have ever read. You do need some background going into this as it does - as he states - deal with a very specific period and in a very concentrated sphere of the war. I felt too, that I need to read some more on the end of the First World War for Germany, the role of Prussia in the German psyche of the time and definitely the agreement of 1918, as the latter could explain much of the psychological background of Germany that might give additional understanding.

If I do have a quibble or a criticism, it is that some passages aren't easy to read. Not due to the subject matter, difficult though that is on occasions, but more due to the awkwardness of the sentence construction and punctuation. Maybe once more through by his editor might not have gone amiss.

Otherwise, essential - and i mean essential - reading for anyone wanting a broader understanding of the Second World War.

Very good book that gives a nice overview of the final days of the Nazi-regime, looking at civilians, soldiers, prisoners and the politicians.

Kershaw examines several related possible reasons Germany's leadership and people continued fighting long after it was obvious World War II was lost. Thoroughly researched and interesting, but I have to be honest that I find his writing style tough going at times.

A man cuts some telephone lines he thinks connect the military bases one to another. He's seen by two members of the Hitler Jugend who report his actions. He's summarily arrested by the local police. The regional commander is summoned and a summary trial is conducted and the man executed. This scenario occurs just four hours from the town being overrun by the Allies in Germany. The question Kershaw asks and answers is why did local bureaucracies and systems continue to function so well as apocalypse was often just minutes away. Why continue to resist at a cost of inevitable total destruction. In early 1945, German soldiers were dying at a rate of 350,000 *per month.* It was a scale of killing that even dwarfed the First World War. British and American bombers were leveling cities and killing thousands of civilians, yet the populace and it's representative structure continued to resist and function.

I was confused in the beginning by what seemed to be contradictory points, i.e., that many in the general staff and lower ranks were very supportive of Hitler to the end while at the same time he cites numerous examples of terror shown to any kind of disloyalty or wavering on the part of civilians or military, especially after the Stauffenberg assassination attempt (an astonishing 20,000 German soldiers were shot as opposed to 40 British which would indicate to me a substantial level of defeatism or discord among the lower ranks). Special squads were created to enforce loyalty and the number of executions soared. At the same time he examines numerous letters and diaries showing support for Hitler among those soldiers and the civilian bureaucracy continued to function at a high level. I might argue that finding support for a position in the myriad number of papers left by the highly literate German people might be found regardless of the overall view.

Contradictions abound and just as one view was proposed, Kershaw presented evidence to the contrary. What’s much clearer is the entanglement of motivations of many different people for many different reasons. Partly, it was that Himmler brought his administration of terror from the East back to the Reich. Another was the personal loyalty of from those mignons at the top, Himmler, Bormann, Goebbels, et al, who derived their power from Hitler so it was natural they would remain fanatically loyal to the end. The extreme brutality of the Russian soldiers on the eastern front led to the desire to hasten westward where the Americans and British were perceived to be more amiable.

The slaughter at the end of the war is simply unimaginable and Kershaw doesn’t spare the reader. Hundreds of thousands died in the last few months of the war. Twice as much tonnage of bombs were dropped by the Allies in the first four months of 1945 than in all of 1943. Millions were left homeless and fled the approach of the Soviet Army eager to apply much of the same fearsome slaughter the Germans had inflicted on the Slavic people on their march east. Fifty percent of the German soldiers who died in the war were killed in the last ten months. A few deserted, most continued to fight. The machinery of the state continued and defeatists were murdered by Nazi death squads.

The failure of the Germans to give up when clearly all was lost may lie in the culture Hitler had created. The oft cited reason of allied demands for unconditional surrender Kershaw dispenses with, if not entirely convincingly. The German people had been so used to dictatorial and fanatic leadership that they were unable to do anything but follow orders and were suitably cowed and ripe for the leadership of anyone. Put broadly, the simplest reason may be that people simply “went along to get along.”

It’s a fascinating study. My only quibble is that I think the book might have been strengthened by a comparison with events in Japan, which, one might argue, were similar.

Knowing how much of a history geek I am, my parents bought me a copy of Ian Kershaw's The End: Germany, 1944-45. I read it over the course of a week, and cannot recommend it enough. As with his biographies of Hitler, which are both scholarly and fascinating, Kershaw writes with an authoritative and rather commanding voice. His research is impeccable.

The End is an admirable and far-reaching study indeed; in his preface, Kershaw writes: 'I have tried to take into account the mentalities of rulers and ruled, of Nazi leaders and lowly members of the civilian population, of generals and ordinary soldiers, and of both the eastern and the western fronts. It is a wide canvas and I have to paint it with a broad brush.' The End is intelligent, informative, and most of all accessible.